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Abstract
The much-hyped new era of globalisation co-exists, paradoxically, with 
strong regional organisations, most notably the European Union and the North 
American Free Trade Area. This paper examines the development of Canadian 
international trade and investment during the past century as affected by the 
potentially conflicting forces of global economic integration and regionalism.
During the first wave of globalisation—the steam driven version of the late 
nineteenth century—an era characterised by multilateral trading and an open 
international currency system based around the gold standard, Canada none-
theless came to rely very heavily on the UK as an outlet for its exports and as 
a source of finance. But even during the first decade of the twentieth century 
the continental pull was exerting a powerful countervailing force that became 
even more apparent during the First World War and the 1920s.
In the era after World War Two Canada became ever more firmly locked into a 
North American economy despite the sporadic attempts by Ottawa to maintain 
geographical diversity of exports and to control the sources of investment. 
During the early stages of the second wave of globalisation, an era that wit-
nessed the relative waning of American predominance and the emergence of 
a more pluralistic international economy, Canada did achieve diversification, 
especially in capital markets. The 1990s, however, have witnessed an even 
greater intensification of global integration, a re-assertion of US hegemony 
and a reinforcement of regional linkages through the Canada-US trade agree-
ment and the NAFTA.  The paper examines the dissonance between globalisa-
tion and regionalism and the implications of this for the pattern of Canadian 
international trade and investment.
At the beginning of the twentieth century Canada’s international trade and 
finance were dominated by two partners, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. During the hundred years or so that followed, Canada’s Atlantic con-
nection has weakened and continental integration, above all with the USA, 
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has deepened. This has been neither a smooth and continuous process nor an 
uncontested one. Ottawa has on several occasions during the twentieth century 
sought to diversify its external economic relations. Further, the challenge of-
fered to the hegemony of the USA by Western Europe during the 1970s and 
1980s also encouraged greater plurality in Canadian trade and investment. 
Much of this was reversed, however, during the 1990s: sustained American 
economic expansion combined with the bilateral trade agreement between 
Canada and the USA and the subsequent formation of the North American 
Free Trade Area (NAFTA) to foster greater continental integration.
One of the distinctive features of the international trading system during the 
first era of globalisation was the complex system of multilateral payments set-
tlement.1  Canada was closely involved in this.  In 1901 approximately 60% of 
Canadian exports were sold in the UK.  The major supplier of imports, how-
ever, was the USA, which had first consistently overtaken Britain as Canada’s 
major source of imports in the late 1880s2, and which by the beginning of 20th 
century was supplying approximately 58% of Canadian imports.  Canada paid 
for these by using its current account surplus with Britain and by borrowing.
By the turn of the century Canada had already embarked on a period of very 
rapid economic expansion associated with the belated settlement of the West. 
Total population, boosted by net immigration of nearly one million, rose from 
5.3 to 7.6 million between 1900-13. If the aim of Macdonald’s National Policy 
had been for Canada to secure and exploit its own west, the wheat boom from 
the late 1890s achieved this helping to bind East and West in the transcon-
tinental economy.  Wheat exports poured across the Atlantic, especially to 
British ports.  But not all of these represented a net gain: the concentration on 
wheat and rapid expansion of urban markets in Canada led to a fall in exports 
of dairy products and exports of bacon, ham and live animals also began to 
shrink.3  Sales to the USA boomed: sawn lumber sold well, and a new genera-
tion of staples, including pulp and pulpwood, gold, copper, nickel and asbestos 
were also prominent.  By the outbreak of war, exports to the United States ac-
counted for 37.5% of the total while Britain’s share had dropped to 50%.
Canada’s engagement in the international economy embraced far more than 
trade. The great boom involved unprecedented levels of investment, much of 
it financed from abroad, especially after1905.  At their peak, in the years im-
mediately before the First World War, British funds alone probably financed 
more than half of total investment that stretched well beyond Canadian domes-
tic savings.4  Borrowing abroad, which tended to draw labour into construction 
and away from the traded goods sector, pulled in imports and thus widened the 
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current account deficit.5  Increasingly these purchases were made south of the 
border.  The shifting composition of imports towards capital goods benefited 
the USA.  ‘Canadian industry rapidly adopted American styles and techniques, 
and this was intensified as American firms established branch factories in 
Canada’.6  Berwick Saul also points out that the geographical advantages of 
American exporters were increased as the Canadian Far West was developed. 
Although imperial preferences were of very limited use to Britain in stem-
ming United States competition in capital goods, low and preferential tariffs 
on some consumer goods, notably woollen textiles, probably helped Britain 
compete against Canadian firms.7 By 1913 the USA accounted for 65% of 
Canadian imports.
In a sense British capital flows were helping to finance Canada’s increasing 
import deficit with the USA.  In 1900 Canada’s export surplus with Britain had 
fulfilled this function, but in the years before the war, largely because of hav-
ing to service the rising British-held debt, Canada lapsed into current account 
deficit with the UK.  By 1914 it was running current account deficits with both 
its major trading partners and paying for these deficits by the capital it raised 
in Britain and the USA.8
Although the absolute level of British investment in Canada had run at unprec-
edented heights, nonetheless by 1913 the US accounted for a larger share of 
foreign investment than in 1901.9  What is particularly significant, however, 
is its dominance of direct investment. This was to become progressively more 
important over the course of the century.  American capital was especially well 
represented in manufacturing, where, in Donald Paterson’s view, companies 
tended to have longer time horizons than in the natural resource sector: ‘This 
helps to explain the persistence of American direct investment and the ephem-
eral quality of the British business presence’.10  
Between the wars
Between the outbreak of World War One and the eve of the 1930s slump, Can-
ada achieved considerable geographical diversification for its exports.  The 
British market was virtually stagnant: although the value of exports increased 
by nearly half, this represented no more than the rise in prices.  The USA 
proved far more dynamic, particularly for wood, wood products and news-
print. Although Canada achieved an even greater proportionate increase in 
exports to other Commonwealth countries (about fourfold between 1913 and 
1928), this was from a very small base.  The most spectacular expansion was 
to other foreign countries: by 1928 exports to this group stood at $451 million, 
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not far behind exports to the USA, and representing a sevenfold increase over 
1913 values.11  The great bulk of this went to continental Europe, with wheat 
predominant.  These were to prove fickle markets.
The United States strengthened its grip on the Canadian import market.  It 
advanced its sales over a wide range of imports, but was particularly strong 
in investment and durable consumer goods, both groups characterised by high 
income elasticity of demand.  But it was in the provision of capital that the US 
staked out an even more prominent position.  British holdings of Canadian 
debt peaked in 1916.  Although the UK had agreed at the beginning of the war 
to meet Canada’s need for finance, the demands of total war stretched its own 
financial capacity.  As early as July 1915 Canada had been forced to turn to 
Wall Street for funds.12  Canadian governments became familiar and trusted 
borrowers in New York and by the 1920s they found it cheaper to borrow there 
than in London.13  Moreover, American companies continued to invest in Can-
ada.  By 1927 the car industry was entirely in the hands of US companies.14 
American companies were also active in the new generation of staples, bring-
ing technical expertise and capital to the base metal and newsprint industries. 
As early as 1922 total holdings of United States capital in Canada overhauled 
British: between 1916 and 1926 British capital was being repatriated,15 and by 
1930 United States accounted for 61% of Canadian foreign debt.
Canada financed its current account deficit with United States (it had substan-
tial net payments from non-merchandise as well as on visible trade account) 
by capital imports from the United States and by running current surpluses 
with countries other than the UK.  It is worth emphasising this, as John Stovel 
does in his account, because the generally accepted notion that Canada gener-
ated surpluses with the UK to pay for imports from United States is not borne 
out.  Although Canada did run small current account surpluses with Britain 
between 1920 and 1926, these turned into substantial deficits between 1927 
and 1932.  Stovel points out that Canada was a supplier of other currencies to 
the UK between 1927 and 1932 both on capital and current accounts.16
By the start of the slump not only had Canada come to rely much less on Brit-
ish sources of capital but it also sold relatively fewer of its exports to Britain. 
But the dynamic markets of the 1920s, continental Europe and the USA, were 
to be the cause of major dislocation to Canada when they collapsed during the 
slump.  While the United States was, of course, to recover, continental Europe 
never again provided a sustained market for Canadian agricultural exports.
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The slump had a disastrous impact on Canadian exports which fell from $1341 
million in 1928 to $495 million in 1932.  Investment expenditure, very high 
during the late 1920s, fell even more sharply than exports.  For much of the 
1930s Canadian farming was devastated, especially on the prairies, and un-
employment was at crippling levels.  The slump was of unprecedented depth, 
the ensuing recovery shallow and far from complete by the time war broke out 
again in Europe.  Not the least of Canadian economic problems in the 1930s 
was dealing with severe balance of payments deficits.  Part of the trouble 
was the deterioration of the current account - while exports plummeted, debt 
servicing proved so intractable that by 1932 it absorbed 53% of merchandise 
export income (in 1928 corresponding figure had been 17%).17  This was 
greatly aggravated because the capital inflows dried up, although unlike most 
countries Canada appears to have been cushioned initially by being able to 
continue raising funds on Wall Street in 1929 and 1930 and by the rush of 
US companies setting up branch plants in Canada as tariff barriers rose and 
exchange barriers mounted.18  Capital inflows contracted in1931 and 1932 but 
there does not appear to have been an outflow until 1933.  In the mid-1930s, by 
which time capital outflows were substantial, Canada had been able to adjust 
its current account.
By some measures the long-run tendency for the Anglo-Canadian economic 
connection to fragment was halted during the slump. The British connection 
provided a major part of Canada’s economic salvation in the 1930s.  Although 
Canadian export earnings in the UK fell sharply between 1928 and 1931, the 
subsequent recovery was rapid: by 1936-8 they averaged $318 million, more 
than double the 1931 value.  These gains were made despite the failure of 
wheat shipments, Canada’s most important export to Britain, to recover to 
pre-depression levels. Moreover, when the lower price levels of the 1930s 
are taken into account, the volume of Canadian exports to Britain did very 
well: they exceeded the high level of 1928 as early as 1932, and by 1937 had 
increased by more than half again.  Three major factors account for this: first, 
the relative buoyancy of the British market for foodstuffs and raw materials 
in the 1930s; secondly, imperial preferences, both formal and informal; and, 
finally, increased Canadian marketing efforts to offset the loss of sales to the 
USA.  By the end of the 1930s supplies from Canada accounted for nearly 9% 
of British imports, more than double the pre-slump proportion.
If measured by exports, Canadian economic dependence on Britain increased 
during the depression: in 1928, 33% of exports were sold in the UK while 
by the late 1930s about 40% of sales went there  (the proportion going to the 
United States fell slightly, from 37% to 35%, the worst losses being to third 
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markets).  There was also a small rise in the proportion of Canadian imports 
from Britain in the 1930s, but not only did this tend to slip later in the decade, 
more important, the total value of Canadian imports stayed well below the pre-
slump levels.  This was an essential element in Canadian balance of payments 
adjustment. In the absence of capital inflows the Canadians secured balance 
by reducing the deficit with the USA and by turning the current account defi-
cit with the UK into a surplus.  By 1939 the value of both British and United 
States investments in Canada were less than in 1930, although the proportions 
remained much the same.
Changes in trade patterns were accompanied by significant developments in 
Canadian commercial and financial policy. R.B. Bennett had actively pursued 
imperial and trading agreement after coming to power in 1930, and Britain’s 
adoption of full-scale protection in the winter of 1931-2 fortuitously presented 
a chance of securing such treaties.19 But even under Bennett’s leadership that 
did not mean fostering the imperial connection at the cost of completely jeop-
ardising relations with the USA. Two events underline this. Although Canada 
had preferential trading links with Britain and other commonwealth members, 
it did not consolidate these by participating in their financial counterpart, the 
sterling area. British overtures to join the emerging sterling area were reject-
ed.20 Secondly, in 1935, Ottawa turned to the United States and signed the first 
trade agreement with its southern neighbour since the reciprocal treaty had 
been abrogated by the Americans in 1866. Further agreements with Britain 
and the USA followed, after tortuous negotiations, in 1938. Canada therefore 
played a reasonably even handed game with its two principal trading partners 
and kept lines of communication as open as possible.
Canadian trade 1945 to the 1970s
In the years following World War II Canadian exports swung strongly to the 
United States. There were three attempts by Ottawa to counteract this increas-
ing dependence on the USA as an outlet for its exports.  The first of these was 
immediately after the war when Canada made strenuous efforts to cultivate 
European and especially British markets.  It was motivated partly by worries 
about the demobilisation and the unwinding of the war economy.  Ottawa 
continued to equate Canada’s prosperity with buoyant exports, and the transi-
tion to peace was going to be difficult, especially if war-swollen exports to 
Britain fell sharply.  Moreover, the dangers of excessive reliance on the USA 
market had been painfully demonstrated in the early 1930s.  The Canadian 
government therefore tried to bolster exports by a combination of long-term 
intergovernmental contracts (very much at variance with its liberal ideologi-
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cal stance) and with loans, notably to the United Kingdom.21  These measures 
failed.22  Europe’s productive capacity was too devastated and the world dollar 
shortage too great.  Lax British policy towards the sterling area also allowed 
dollars to be dissipated within the sterling Commonwealth.  Canadian exports 
were briefly boosted, but once the dollar loans had been spent, restrictions on 
dollar imports into Britain and the sterling area Commonwealth hit Canadian 
sales badly.  Moreover, even the sales that were made were largely unrequited 
in that they were paid for by the Canadian dollars loaned to Europe in the first 
place.  They therefore failed to earn Canada the convertible currency to pay 
for the imports flooding in from the USA.  To compound problems inward 
investment failed to recover after the war.  By late 1947 Canada’s international 
economic position was desperate, its gold and dollar reserves largely spent and 
neither Washington nor Wall Street sympathetic.  Faced by economic catastro-
phe, restrictive controls on exports to the USA were scrapped, and energetic 
efforts made to attract American capital.23  As the United States recovered 
from recession in 1948–49, and especially after the outbreak of the Korean 
War in 1950, exports to the United States rose sharply.
This surge of exports to the United States combined with a series of discrimi-
natory cuts on dollar imports by Britain, other European countries and the 
Commonwealth led to a dramatic switch in the direction of Canadian exports. 
During the 1950s Canadian exporters continued to enjoy buoyant markets in 
the USA.  American procurement policies, shaped by the Cold War, favoured 
a close and secure neighbour,24 and a combination of prosperity and reduced 
tariff barriers boosted Canadian sales.  The striking reliance on one market did 
sometimes worry Ottawa, and there were two further attempts to seek other 
markets for Canadian exports.
The first was John Diefenbaker’s 1957 trade diversion offer whereby he pro-
posed to switch 15% of Canadian imports to the UK.  Announced over the 
heads of his civil service, it was immediately obvious that the figure had been 
clutched from the air and was impossible to achieve without an extension of 
tariff preferences to the UK.25  The British response was interesting: since 
there was no chance of new preferences which were ruled out under the GATT, 
they quietly proposed a free trade pact to Ottawa.  Since even London realised 
this was far more advantageous to Britain than Canada it was little surprise 
that Ottawa rejected the scheme.26
Much of the initial switch in the proportion of Canadian exports to the USA 
had occurred by 1950.  It was consolidated by two sets of factors.  One centred 
on the relative size of the British and American import markets in total world 
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trade.  In the late 1930s Britain had been by far the world’s leading import 
market, accounting for 16% of world imports.  After the war the US rapidly 
overtook the UK as the world’s premier market.  By 1970 the USA accounted 
for 12.2% of world imports while the British share had dropped to 6.6%.  So 
even if Canada’s respective share of British and American imports had re-
mained unchanged, there would have been a major switch to the USA.  But 
this movement was reinforced because Canada made major advances in the 
American market.  By the late 1940s Canada supplied 16% of American im-
ports, slightly up from the12–14% typical of the inter-war years.  Canada-USA 
trade was given a further boost by the 1965 Auto Pact which established quali-
fied free trade in cars and parts between manufacturers and guaranteed Canada 
a larger share of the North American production.  By the early 1970s cars and 
components were Canada’s largest export.  This was one factor contributing to 
Canada increasing its share of the American import market to approximately 
28% by the late 1960s, well over twice the proportion of the inter-war years. 
In short, the redirection of Canada’s exports that had occurred by the second 
half of the 1960s was partly because of the rapid growth of American imports, 
encouraged by trade liberalisation, and partly a result of the greater share of 
the market that Canada had carved out itself.  But it was also the counterpart 
to developments in Europe.  The European Community rapidly emerged as 
an inward looking body, and this was true above all of its agricultural policy. 
Britain was eventually drawn into the system, incorporation into the Euro-
pean Community in 1973 accelerating the structural transformation of British 
imports.  This process was well under way before British membership: very 
modest growth in food consumption combined with a dramatic expansion of 
British agricultural production had led to a sharp fall in British food imports 
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Figure 1: Destination of Canadian exports 1901–1980
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during the 1960s.  Similarly, the decline in raw material imports also contrib-
uted to ‘the dramatic marginalisation of the white dominions’ in the geography 
of UK trade.27  While in the 1950s manufactures constituted one-quarter of 
British imports, by the 1980s they accounted for more than three-quarters. 
Not only had Britain’s relative world importance as an importer declined, the 
type of import and its provenance had been transformed.
By the early 1970s there was growing concern in Canada about the increasing 
preponderance of the USA as a market. The dangers of this were brought home 
by the economic measures taken by President Richard Nixon in August 1971. 
In response to the American dollar crisis, amongst other action, a ten per cent 
surcharge was imposed on imports into the U.S. The rejection of Canadian 
pleas for exemption encouraged Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to re-examine 
Canadian trade policy, and the resulting ‘Third Option’ was a clear attempt to 
distance Canada from the American economy.  Trudeau, arguing that preserva-
tion of the status quo was unacceptable, and dismissing the policy of strength-
ening economic ties with the United States, pressed instead for the third option 
of actively seeking diversification of external economic links.  The timing 
could hardly have been worse.  The post-war ‘Golden Age’ of rapid economic 
growth and full employment among the rich countries was coming to an end. 
The break-up of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system between 1971 
and 1973 ushered in an era of exchange rate instability.  In 1973 rising world 
commodity prices injected strong inflationary pressures into the international 
system before, in the northern winter of 1973–74, the quadrupling of oil prices 
fanned global inflation and wrought havoc with oil importers’ balance of pay-
ments. World trade stagnated and protectionism mounted.  Even if nothing 
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Figure 2: Sources of Canadian foreign investment (accumulated totals) 1901–1980
LONDON JOURNAL OF CANADIAN STUDIES 19: 2003/2004
10
ROOTH AND WALSH: CANADA IN THE TWENTIETH CENUTRY
11
else condemned Trudeau’s initiative, the international economic environment 
guaranteed its failure.  Not only did Canada fail to make advances in the mar-
kets of the European Union and Japan but it also lost ground to competitors. 
While in 1970 Canada had accounted for 2.3% of EU imports and 4.9% of 
those of Japan, by 1980 the figures were 1.2% and 3.4% respectively. 
The increasing dependence of Canada on the U.S. as an outlet for its exports 
that so concerned Trudeau was mirrored in its foreign borrowing. Although 
immediately after the war both inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 
portfolio capital had proved elusive, by the 1950s Canada was able to revert 
to the patterns of the 1920s: current account deficits covered by inflows of 
FDI and borrowing from United States. Although initially this was widely 
welcomed in Canada, in time anxieties grew.  The tendency of American 
companies operating in Canada to source imports from the USA worsened 
the balance of trade deficit.  Walter Gordon’s first budget, in 1963, placed re-
straints on inward investment.28  The Watkins Report of 1968 and Gray Report 
of 1972 reflected growing anxieties about the scale of American ownership of 
Canada’s resources, and formed part of a critique sceptical of the benefits to 
the Canadian economy of continued reliance on American capital.29  By the 
end of 1970 non-residents, predominantly Americans, controlled 36% of all 
capital employed in nonfinancial industry in Canada.  In response to the grow-
ing anxieties about U.S. ownership, in 1974 the Foreign Investment Review 
Agency was established to screen incoming investment.  The National Energy 
Program of 1980 also involved restrictions on foreign ownership.  Canadians 
moved to reclaim ownership of their economy, and by the 1980s non-residents 
ownership had retreated to 23% of all capital outside the financial sector.30 
The sources of inward investment were also beginning to diversify. One cause 
of this was that the preponderance of the USA became less pronounced and 
power in the international economy became increasingly dispersed.  This was 
reinforced by the increasing globalisation of international capital markets. The 
integration of domestic financial markets meshed with growing international 
capital mobility: the emergence of Euro currency markets in the late 1960s, 
the re-cycling of the OPEC surpluses in the mid-1970s, and the relaxation or 
scrapping of controls on international investment by several countries contrib-
uted to a great surge in international capital mobility.  This had a considerable 
impact on the sources and type of inward investment to Canada. Portfolio 
investment rose sharply and the U.S. share of total investment declined notice-
ably.  Bonds, mainly government debt, increased as a proportion of total exter-
nal liabilities.  While up to the early 1970s the United States had accounted for 
80% of total foreign ownership of bonds this had fallen to 29% by 1989.  Japan 
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in particular became important, but other countries participated too.  FDI also 
came increasingly from Japan, the European Union, and ‘other’ sources. By 
1991 the U.S. share of total stocks of foreign investment in Canada had fallen 
from its 1980 level of 79 per cent to 43.8 per cent.  Another striking feature was 
the rapid accumulation of overseas assets by Canadians.  Portfolio investment 
became more important with mutual funds, increasingly liberalised, playing a 
prominent part.31  The holdings of immigrants, especially from the Far East, 
also contributed to the rapid accumulation of funds.  There was also a limited 
diversification of Canadian FDI away from the USA, and by the mid-1980s a 
sharp increase to Europe notably the UK, France and the Netherlands.
Canada’s trading patterns were also affected during these years by the greater 
dispersion of global economic power.  Although this had only a limited and 
transitory impact on exports in the late 1970s, it was far more pronounced in 
the sources of imports. In the 1980s the EU and Japan made conspicuous gains 
and the American share of imports fell from 67.5 per cent in 1980 to 62.6 per 
cent in 1990.
Post-Trudeau
The Trudeau governments, wary of the overweening power and influence of 
the USA, had sought to distance the Canadian economy from its neighbour. 
The Progressive Conservative administration of Brian Mulroney possessed 
none of these inhibitions, and ushered in a new era of economic consolida-
tion with the USA.  The modest screening devices of the Foreign Investment 
Review Agency were replaced in 1985 by the Investment Canada Agency the 
task of which was to encourage funds to Canada. Developments in the USA, 
moreover, were to exert a powerful influence on Canada’s trading patterns 
and policies. Consciousness of a challenge to the world status of the USA that 
went well beyond economic discomforts, the new President, Ronald Reagan, 
determined that America should ‘Stand Tall’. The economic implications of 
this were confusing. While tight monetary policy both squeezed the domestic 
economy and drove the value of the dollar sharply upwards, tax cuts com-
bined with massive increases in military spending wrought havoc with the 
national finances. Military Keynesianism bought rapid recovery, initiating a 
sustained expansion of the economy that sucked in imports that were made all 
the cheaper by the appreciation of the dollar. Canada benefited, but became in-
creasingly exposed. The less favourable economic conditions of the 1970s had 
already led to a proliferation of non-tariff barriers in the USA: voluntary ex-
port restraints, orderly marketing agreements and buy-American requirements 
increasingly hampered trade.32 Intense import competition, particularly in the 
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recession, hit smokestack industries, savaged jobs and, combined with a bur-
geoning balance of payments deficit, fed a great protectionist revival. By the 
mid-1980s there were some 300 protectionist bills circulating in Congress.33 
Mounting protectionism and emerging trade disputes formed the backdrop for 
debate in Canada about the Macdonald Commission Report. A product of its 
era, it expressed alarm about the relentless rise of government expenditure. 
It was also deeply pessimistic about the future for natural resource exports, 
arguing that Canada had to have a sophisticated manufacturing base. The pre-
requisite for this was considered to be a market of 100 million plus; this, the 
Report recommended, could be found by negotiating substantially freer trade 
with the U.S. But the negotiations for this soon turned, under U.S. pressure, 
into a far more wide-ranging pact than the Commissioners had first envis-
aged.  Although economists were almost unanimously in favour of the Free 
Trade Agreement that emerged, the high degree of reliance of Canada on an 
increasingly protectionist American market ensured that the national debate 
would be conducted in an atmosphere of fear and vulnerability. The Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement, implemented in 1989, gave institutional force to 
Continentalism. 
This was reinforced by the reassertion of American hegemony. While globali-
sation powered on during the 1990s, it did so very much on the United States 
agenda and with the Anglo-Saxon model to the fore.  With the collapse of the 
Soviet empire and with the Japanese and German models losing their lustre, 
American hegemony was reasserted.  The United States economy experienced 
its longest ever period of uninterrupted expansion between 1992 and 2001; 
although this was not the fastest growth in American history, jobs and total 
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Figure 3: Direction of Canada’s merchandise exports 1971–2002
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output increased impressively, and towards the end of the decade productiv-
ity growth accelerated too. This has to be seen in the context of the relative 
weakness of the European and Japanese economies during the 1990s, and 
the flaccid behaviour of their imports. In contrast, American imports proved 
rather too dynamic. Accordingly America has increased its weight in world 
imports: while in 1990 it accounted for 14.8 per cent of world imports, by 
2000 that share had risen to 18.7 per cent. This has increased still further the 
high proportion of Canadian sales to the USA: by 2002, 87.5 per cent of total 
merchandise exports went to its neighbour (measured on a Customs basis).  
The trade agreements have not led to the Canadian share of U.S. imports ris-
ing, and, despite NAFTA and the depreciation of the Canadian dollar, they 
remained in the 18-19.5 per cent range during the 1990s. This does not mean 
that the agreements had no impact, for trade in the newly liberalised sectors 
grew substantially faster than in the non-liberalised groups (and this is true of 
imports too)34.  The import trend is far less pronounced.  The United States 
increased its share of Canadian imports in the early 1990s, but, hampered by 
the appreciating U.S. dollar in the late 1990s, has dropped back sharply since 
1998.   One consequence of this has been the emergence for the first time in 
peace of a large Canadian current account balance of payments surplus with 
the USA.  
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Figure 4: Sources of Canadian foreign investment (accumulated totals) 1991–2002
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The American share of Canadian capital imports has also revived, and this is 
apparent both in bonds and stocks. In large part the Japanese have retreated; 
the European Union has retained the share it staked out in the 1980s, so the 
U.S. gain has been at the expense of Japan but also of the ‘other’ investors that 
had appeared in the 1980s. As indicated in Figure 4, between 1991 and 2002 
the U.S. share of the total stock of foreign investment in Canada rose from 
43.8 per cent to 60.2 per cent while that of Japan dropped sharply.  Canadian 
outward foreign investment has continued to grow apace, and has remained 
cosmopolitan in range.
Canadian Continentalism does not reach very far south in the Americas, al-
though Canada’s trade with Mexico is partly an exception. Exports to Mexico 
grew very rapidly in the 1990s, averaging over 10% per annum, but they 
nonetheless still account for less than one per cent of total Canadian exports. 
Imports from Mexico have proved even more dynamic, growing even faster 
than exports, and from a larger base, with the result that Mexico now runs a 
large trade surplus with Canada.
Yet this is not part of a broader Latin American movement for Canada. Far 
from it, for in a sense Mexico has displaced other western hemisphere sup-
plies, the total imports from which have failed to keep pace with the overall 
expansion of Canadian imports. Latin America has also proved a disappoint-
ing export market. Despite expansion to Mexico, total sales to Latin America 
and the Caribbean were lower in 2002 than they had been six years earlier, 
having been badly affected by the financial crises of 2001–2 that hit the major 
South American economies of Brazil and Argentina. By 2002 exports to the 
region accounted for only 1.5 per cent of total world sales.
Nor has Continentalism had much bearing on investment linkages beyond the 
USA.  Latin America has never been a major source of funds into Canada, but 
has been relatively important as an outlet. Taking the western hemisphere mi-
nus the USA, it is the Caribbean countries, above all Bermuda and Barbados 
that have proved the main attraction for Canadian investors. There was abso-
lute growth in flows to South America during the 1990s, but the recent crises 
have seen a marked withdrawal from Brazil and Argentina (Chile has proved 
more resilient and has overtaken Brazil as the major Latin American outlet). 
The apparently remorseless drift of Canada towards closer economic depend-
ence on the U.S. was checked during the later 1970s and 1980s by the globali-
sation of capital markets and by the presence of counterweights to American 
dominance of the international economy. In the 1990s not only have regional 
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trade agreements given institutional form to the closer economic integration 
of North America but also U.S. influence has been reinforced by its sustained 
economic expansion. This has been pushed into even clearer relief by the 
experience of other major economic powers. Germany, for so long the power-
house of the European economy, experienced slow growth during the 1990s 
after reunification. The Japanese miracle ended in spectacular property crashes 
in 1989, and the economy has been mired in recession and slow growth ever 
since with its fragile, debt-laden banking system struggling to survive. While 
the USA has enjoyed its longest ever period of uninterrupted economic expan-
sion it has exercised a benign influence. Expansive markets have certainly 
helped to sustain a major growth of Canadian exports. Other countries have, so 
far, been willing to finance the huge current account deficit of the U.S. balance 
of payments. But protectionist forces, never far below the surface, have re-
emerged, most notably with steel tariffs, the recent trade tensions with China, 
and, painfully for Canada, in the long-festering lumber disputes. As the U.S. 
has shown a blind disregard for the interests and views of other nations since 
the Bush administration came to power, the dangers of the Canadian version 
of Continentalism are once more underlined. The robustness of the NAFTA 
disputes mechanism is likely to be tested.  
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